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Abstract: From the early twentieth century to the present day, Transcarpathia has
belonged to several states: the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, Czechoslovakia,
the Hungarian Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and finally to Ukraine. The status
of what counts as a minority and a majority language has changed each time
the state affiliation has been changed. Based on the long term research by
Csernicskó, and on the one-month fieldwork carried out by Laihonen in 2012,
our goal is to provide an autonomous critical account and discourse analysis
of the linguistic situation in Transcarpathia. We draw examples especially
from the linguistic landscape, which documents the hybrid practices difficult
to catch with other means. Different nation states have aimed to evaluate
certain languages over others. However, Transcarpathia has been too far
away from different national centers and it has therefore remained a periph-
ery. In the everyday life of Transcarpathians, ironies around language reper-
toires, standardization and heteroglossia come into the fore, especially in the
current context. Such unexpected linguistic practices or “pre-nationalist” and
“non-purist” ideologies offer a change to see how certain categories, such as
language, have remained in their hybrid forms and are still clearly “in the
making”.
Keywords: Transcarpathia, language policy, linguistic landscape, Hungarian
language, Rusyn language, Ukrainian language
1 Introduction
One of the famous anecdotes on the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and its
successor states goes as follows: “A visitor, encountering one of the oldest local
inhabitants, asks about his life. The reply: ‘I was born in Austria-Hungary,
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I went to school in Czechoslovakia, I did my army service in Horthy’s Hungary,
followed by a spell in prison in the USSR. Now I am ending my days in
independent Ukraine.’ The visitor expresses surprise at how much of the world
the old man has seen. ‘But no!’, he responds, ‘I’ve never left this village!’” (Butt
2002: 155). The village lies in Transcarpathia, today a part of Ukraine, which is
the focus of this article (Figure 1).
Geographically the territory with a current population of nearly 1.2 million
inhabitants borders on the Carpathian Mountains from North-East, and partly
the river Tisza from the South. Thus the varying names, according to whether we
view the region from the West/South (Subcarpathia), or as officially today, from
the North/East (Transcarpathia).
The aim of this article is to describe and explain long term local and wider
language policy processes in the region in order to understand their present
trajectories. Our approach is that of a critical study of language policy (e.g.
Shohamy 2006). The whirlwinds of European history have been accompanied by
changes in language policy, with the status of minority and majority languages
changing with each switch of state affiliation. Even the definition of what
counted as a language and what was defined as a dialect among the Slavic
varieties changed according to which entity ruled the region. Table 1 shows that
during the twentieth century the present-day Transcarpathian region belonged
Figure 1: Current Transcarpathia in Ukraine (map created by István D. Molnár, source: www.
naturalearthdata.com).
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to several different states: the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, Czechoslovakia,
the Hungarian Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and finally to Ukraine.
The region’s identity as the westernmost part of sovereign Ukraine is still in the
making. Since 1991, there have also been significant changes in language policy in
Ukraine in general, which have greatly affected administration and education in
Transcarpathia. We contextualize and interpret the contemporary language situa-
tion and language policy on the basis of current sociolinguistic theory (e.g.
Pavlenko 2008; Blommaert 2010; Pennycook 2012) and the region’s place in
Europe, the Post-Soviet space, Ukraine, and East-Central Europe. Contemporary
linguistic practices and policies will be discussed also from the viewpoint of the
changing Linguistic Landscape, where language is “not just in the heads of the
people”, but a vital “part of the physical environment” (Pennycook 2012: 26). A
Table 1: Political status of the region between 1867 and 2013.
State affiliation Period Name of the region Status of the region
The Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy
– Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa,
Máramaros counties
Four counties of the Hungarian
Kingdom.
People’s Republic of
Hungary and the Hungarian
Soviet Republic (HSR)
– Ruska Craina (
Dec. ); Hucul Republic
(Гуцульська Руспубліка)
( Jan. )
The autonomy of Ruska Craina
inside the HSR existed only in
theory. The Hucul Republic
referred to the eastern part of
the HSR.
Czechoslovak Republic – Podkarpatska Rus Autonomy was not
implemented in practice.
Second Czech-Slovak
Republic
– Podkarpatska Rus,
(Подкарпатська Русь)
An autonomous territory within
the federal Czechoslovakia
Carpathian Ukraine Mar. –,  Carpathian Ukraine
(Карпатська Україна)
Declared independence,
however it was not recognized.
Hungarian Kingdom – Subcarpathian Province
(Kárpátaljai
Kormányzóság)
The territory was ruled by a
“temporary” governor (Rusyn
autonomy was not realized).
Transcarpathian Ukraine Nov. , –
Jan. , 
Transcarpathian
Ukraine (Закарпатська
Україна)
A temporary state without
international recognition
created by the Soviet Union
prior to joining the USSR
The Soviet Union – Transcarpathian Oblast
(Закарпатская
область)
An administrative region within
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic
Ukraine From  Transcarpathian Oblast
(Закарпатська
область)
An administrative region within
the independent Ukraine
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further focus is on education, an arena where those in authority can turn ideology
into practice or negotiate, demand, and introduce alternative language policies,
and hence turn practice into ideology (Shohamy 2006: 76). The following map
(Figure 2) shows the division of present Transcarpathia according to the different
linguistic groups, as recorded in the Ukrainian 2001 census.
Transcarpathia as a whole has a Slavic majority and the South-Western strip
has a Hungarian majority. The eastern parts have a concentration of Romanian
villages bordering Romania. There are still a dwindling number of Germans left
in Transcarpathia as well. Even though Rusyn was not one of the language
options in the 2001 census, it is notable that some inhabitants nevertheless
insisted on citing it as their “mother tongue”.
In the Hungarian Kingdom, Subcarpathia was a North-Eastern periphery,
characterized by (what was then called) a Rusyn peasantry. During the division
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after World War One, the Rusyn, represented
mainly by Western emigrants, strived for an independent state as well. However,
due to developments in the neighboring regions (annexations of other Rusyn
regions to Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia), the small number of Rusyns,
and relatively weak national aspirations, Czechoslovakia was seen by influential
Figure 2: Map of Transcarpathia according to mother tongue in the 2001 census (created by
István D. Molnár; sources: Vdovenko 2007; www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/notice/news.php?
type¼ 2&id1¼ 21).
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Rusyn emigrants to be the best fit for a foster state for the Subcarpathian region
(e.g. Butt 2002: 162). An almost homogenous Hungarian-speaking Western swath
was annexed to Czechoslovakia together with the Rusyn parts on account of
access to the plains, the Tisza river, and the railroad connection (e.g. Kamuszella
2012: 661). This strip was briefly returned to Hungary proper between 1938
and1944, the rest being a World War Two Hungarian province. The fate of
Subcarpathia was finally decided by the victorious Soviets, who moved it from
Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1946. At that
relatively late point in European history, the Rusyns were turned into
Ukrainians and their language was downgraded to the status of a dialect of
the Ukrainian language. With regards to the Rusyn, Ukraine continued the
Soviet policy until 2012 when it included Rusyn among its recognized minority
languages, at least formally.
This article is based on the one hand on long term research by Csernicskó,
who is a local inhabitant of Transcarpathia. On the other hand, it is based on
readings and several visits to the region by Laihonen, a Finnish researcher
competent in Hungarian, and especially on the one-month fieldwork carried
out by him in two villages in November 2012. During this fieldwork Laihonen
carried out forty interviews in Hungarian and took approximately one thousand
photos. The interviews were settled through a local Hungarian contact at peo-
ple’s homes. The informants were easy to find and they were very talkative. Most
of the informants were Hungarians according to local categories, but four Rusyn
or Ukrainian informants and two Roma families were interviewed as well.
Csernicskó is based in the Hungarian ethnic region and Laihonen carried out
similar fieldwork in Hungarian enclaves in Slovakia and Romania in 2011 and
2012. Therefore, our study may be biased towards a Hungarian perspective.
However, Csernicskó has also worked on Ukrainian as a second language as
well as on Rusyn and Roma issues. Furthermore, the focus of Laihonen’s work
has been on multilingualism and on the comparative angle. Our data takes the
form of interviews, photography, and texts from various sources and ranges
from language laws, “the most powerful devices used in democratic states”
(Shohamy 2006: 60), to graffiti, perhaps the least “official” form of language
display (e.g. Pennycook 2010).
In a groundbreaking article on the language situation in Post-Soviet space,
Pavlenko (2008) has described the sociolinguistic situation and research on
different countries. We heed her call for cooperation between local and
Western scholars (p. 277). Furthermore, we take her Post-Soviet perspective
further by investigating a special historical region rather than focusing on the
state level. Transcarpathia is a special case that has remained largely unknown
and essentially invisible for sociolinguistics. It is peculiar, for instance, that
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Pavlenko (2008, 2009, 2011, 2013) in her works often deals with different
Ukrainian regions and cities, yet Transcarpathia is never mentioned. This may
be regarded as evidence that Transcarpathia does not fit the general models of
explanation of the Post-Soviet space, or Ukraine. Our goal is thus to provide an
autonomous and updated account and discourse analysis of the linguistic
situation in Transcarpathia.
As Shohamy (2006) has argued, language policy is based on language ideol-
ogies of individuals and groups who typically have political, social, and economic
goals. Pavlenko (2008: 300) in turn has established that in Post-Soviet space,
language policies have served the interests of the (changing) dominant ethnic and
political groups. Finally, Pavlenko (2008, 2011) sees the linguistic situation in the
Post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, as a typical post-colonial linguistic regime
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, even though nation building in
other parts of Ukraine is to a certain extent a case of promoting the local majority
or “national” language, (e.g. Pavlenko 2011), Butt (2002: 175) has stressed that
“Transcarpathia simply does not fit into a Europe of nation-states”. That is,
neither the idea of the Western world’s development through nationalist moder-
nization towards post-nationalism and globalized economy (Heller 2011) nor the
postcolonial perspective (Pavlenko 2008) work in our case. Instead, in the every-
day life of mobile (Pennycook 2012) Transcarpathians as well as accidental
tourists in Transcarpathia, ironies and paradoxes around language repertoires,
standardization, and heteroglossia come to the fore, especially in the current
context of globalization (see Blommaert 2010). Such unexpected linguistic prac-
tices or “pre-nationalist” and “non-purist” ideologies still found in Europe are
important since they “are tied to the possibilities of critical thought” (Pennycook
2012: 29); that is, they offer a chance to see how certain categories (such as
languages) have transparently remained in their original diverse forms, or at
least are still clearly “in the making”.
2 Complex historical perspectives
The proportional number of different ethnicities in the twentieth century cen-
suses in Transcarpathia demonstrates how these have developed over time; at
the same time, it shows how certain ethnicities have been defined or recognized
in different periods in accordance with the requirements of different censuses.
A critical stance on the numbers and categories of censuses has already been
established (e.g. Moore et al. 2010). However, Transcarpathia presents an
extreme case illustration of how crude and relative census information can be.
Figure 3 visualizes the changes in numbers and census categories.
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The Slavic population of Transcarpathia was defined as Rusyn until the end of
World War 2. After that, their ethnicity was redefined as Ukrainian. This move
is the origin of much present controversy over the Rusyn question. For
instance, Kuzio’s (2005) critical stance towards the “revival” of Rusyn leans
on censuses which show that Rusyns, decisively for Kuzio, have not “revived”.
However, in the same article, the author describes how the “Ukrainian aca-
demics [planning the 2001 census] refused to acknowledge that Rusyns are a
nationality distinct from Ukrainians” (p. 8). Russians appear first in the Soviet
period (1946–1991) in significant numbers. The Jewish population in turn was
long counted among the Hungarians, and many were Hungarian first-language
speakers (see Magocsi 2005). In Subcarpathia the Holocaust was carried out by
Hungary, with some towns ironically losing their Hungarian-speaking majority
as a result. The memory of the Subcarpathian Jewry is visible in Jewish
cemeteries, now taken care of by local inhabitants in most cities (with support
from Jewish organizations in the US), which have tiny communities of elderly
Jews as well.
In general, the groups representing state communities or related sub-
ethnicities have grown in number during their period of dominance. For
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Figure 3: Census results according to nationality/ethnicity in Transcarpathia
(see Csernicskó 2013: 19 for sources).
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instance, the number of Slovaks was highest during the Czechoslovak reign
(1920–1938). Beyond the typical tendency of claiming the dominant ethnic
identity, this was partly thanks to the Czechoslovak colonies established in
the Hungarian enclave. Most of the now Ukrainian villages near the
Hungarian border have their roots in these interwar Slavic colonies.
What is now called Transcarpathia was and still is a dominated region, a
tiny periphery (see Pietikäinen & Holmes 2013) of imperiums and states.
Consider for instance the geographical distances to the “imperial” and
“national” capitals, where the decisions on the region and its language
policies were made: Vienna (555 km), Budapest (330 km), Prague (720 km),
Moscow (1,600 km), and Kyiv (820 km). This confirms Pujolar’s (2013: 58)
generalization that it is typical for historical linguistic minorities in Europe
to occupy regions which are distant from economic and political centres.
The capitals to the West – Vienna, Budapest and Prague – have meanwhile
lost their historical minorities, replaced relatively recently with what
May (2012: 89) calls the “modern urban migrants” typical of large Western
cities.
Though peripheries often have the potential to shift in accordance with
changes in perspective (Pietikäinen & Holmes 2013), Butt (2002: 157) sum-
marizes the economic perspective on Transcarpathia as follows: “[I]t has
always been the most remote, inaccessible, economically backward region of
whatever state it has belonged to.” Budapest, Prague and Kyiv have all pro-
mised autonomy for the region, typically around historical turning points
(1918–9, 1938–40, 1991–2), but none have put it into practice. For Budapest
and Prague, the region with a Rusyn majority was an Eastern “annex”,
whereas for Moscow and Kyiv it was the most Western point of dominance;
that is, the “European” part of Ukraine, as some accounts (e.g. Butt 2002) refer
to it. This is still symbolized today, for instance, by the use of a non-official
different time-zone from Kyiv, which typically is a source of some confusion for
visitors to Transcarpathia. In Figure 4, the opening hours of a café are given as
“7.00–23.00 local time/8.00–24.00 Kyiv time”. In everyday life, local time is in
use, while larger institutions (e.g. banks), state offices, border crossings,
trains, and schools use the official “Kyiv time”.
The government centres have both used Transcarpathia as a resource (e.g.
through mining) as well as bringing some “national” investments to the
region: the Czech government built bridges and town centres during their
rule, and the Soviet regime established the first university in the region.
However, it is still too early to point to a contribution by Ukraine. Among
other issues, the development of the roads and other infrastructure has been
neglected by Ukraine and there is now a significant contrast between
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Transcarpathia and its Western neighbours (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and
Romania) that was not there in the Soviet period (cf. Jóźwiak 2013).
Next, we take a historical perspective of the approximate statuses of different
languages during different eras following a modified model of Kloss’ (1967: 15)
classification (1 ¼ state language… 6 ¼ not recognized, Table 2).
The adjusted categories of Kloss (1967: 15) denominate the following char-
acterizations of the language:
1 Official language country-wide.
2 The official language of a larger regional unit.
3 Minority language use permitted as the language of instruction in public
education etc., but no official status.
4 Tolerance towards the language in the private sphere.
5 Prohibition of the language.
6 Language status not recognized (e.g. official status of a “dialect”).
Figure 4: Café opening
hours in Ukrainian: local
and Kyiv time-zones on
display (photo by
Csernicskó).
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The basic adjustment to these categories is that Kloss (1967) did not consider the
possibility of not recognizing a “language” on the basis that it is defined as a
dialect of another language. This possibility is more typical than we might think
(e.g. Fishman & Garcia 2010–2011). The Rusyn vernacular is spoken by the
majority of the population, and it has been (re-)recognized as a language by
several states including Slovakia, Serbia, Hungary, and Poland (e.g. Magocsi
1995) as well as in principle by Ukraine in its new law on languages in 2012,
which will be discussed later. However, in 1945 the Soviet regime declared
Rusyn ethnicity and language as a sub-group of the Ukrainian nation and the
Slavic vernaculars spoken in Transcarpathia as dialects of Ukrainian. According
to Kuzio (2005: 3), one of the major justifications for the westward expansion of
the Soviet Union was that such regions as Transcarpathia included large
“Ukrainian” ethnic majorities, which were consistent with the Ukrainian nation-
alists’ claims. Thus, in Kuzio’s words (2005: 3): “the Communists hailed the
‘unification’ of Transcarpathia, as well as other regions of western Ukraine, with
Soviet Ukraine in World War II as a major Soviet achievement”. The independent
Ukraine found this solution even more convenient and fitting to the nation
building scheme. At the same time, most “potential” Rusyns in Transcarpathia
have internalized the idea that Rusyn is a dialect of Ukrainian. For instance,
during fieldwork in 2012, despite being helped by locals to find “Rusyns”,
Laihonen was unable to find a single informant that would state otherwise. In
Table 2: The status of major languages used in Transcarpathia/Subcarpathia.
Rusyn Ukrainian Hungarian Russian (Czecho)
slovak
Romanian
The Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy (–)
 –    
Czechoslovak Republic
(–)
     
Second Czech-Slovak
Republic (–)
     
Carpathian Ukraine () –   –  
Hungarian Kingdom
(/–)

(Province)
    
The Soviet Union
(–)
     
Ukraine (–)   (from
)
   
Present Ukraine
(–)
?  ?   
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Kuzio’s critical (2005: 4) view, there may have been several changes in national
and ethnic identity affiliation among the Slavic population of Transcarpathia in
the twentieth century. At the same time, Magocsi (1995) has stressed that a Post-
Soviet Rusyn ethnolinguistic revival in Transcarpathia would be a natural cause
of action in the context of revival of minorities throughout Europe. This stance is
also followed by Butt (2002), who bases her view on local activists found in
Rusyn civil associations. European institutions have supported the recognition
of the independent Rusyn identity since the 1990s (Trier 1999).
According to Kushko (2007: 128): “because of its hybrid nature, Rusyn has
the potential to serve as a link between different Slavic languages”. However,
historical and political distance between Transcarpathia and the Ukrainian
heartlands (West and Central Ukraine) is considerable. In brief, political rather
than linguistic factors support or hinder the development of Rusyn towards the
status of a widely perceived or imagined independent language again.
While the Rusyns were the last minority to turn against Greater Hungary, they
also faced nationalizingmeasures by Hungarians towards the end of the nineteenth
century that mobilized their very small elite to develop their own institutions and to
fight for the use of their own language in local administration, education, media,
and culture (e.g. Kuzio 2005). In principle, there were Rusyn schools in the
Hungarian Kingdom and Czechoslovakia; however, the Church Slavonic and
“Russified” forms of Rusyn literacy were in use as much as local vernaculars.
Since the formerly common written language, Church Slavonic, slowly
became defunct in the nineteenth century (see Rusinko 1996), the development
of a common language for written use took three directions among the Rusyn: 1)
the development of a Rusyn standard based on local dialects and Church
Slavonic; 2) the use of Russian, which has an established standard and prestigious
literary tradition; and 3) the development of a standard based on dialects in
central Ukraine, which are much closer to Rusyn dialects than Russian (e.g.
Kushko 2007). All these solutions had supporters among the Rusyn intellectuals.
For instance, the most famous leader of the Rusyns, Augustin Voloshyn (1874–
1945), first promoted the autonomous status of a Rusyn language and later (from
1920) turned to support the Ukrainian standpoint (Csernicskó, 2013). Among the
distant centres, Hungary supported the autonomous Rusyn language. The Prague
regime, which had barely any speakers of the state language in the area, in turn
declared that the “language of the local people” should be used. In practice,
however, in elevated (official, educational) contexts the nearest standardized
“Lesser-Russian” language, that is Ukrainian in Galicia (Poland), was promoted
instead of standardizing Rusyn or using Russian. In the Soviet Union, the Slavic
vernaculars became a part of the Ukrainian language and Russian was the official
language and the language of interethnic communication.
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The different statuses of languages have been reflected in languages
taught and used at schools: the states have made efforts to make the privi-
leged language the general medium of teaching. Modernization and general
education reached Subcarpathia towards the end of nineteenth century, along
with the Hungarization process in the Hungarian Kingdom. In the Rusyn-
medium schools this meant that the so called “patriotic subjects” (geography,
history, and citizenship) were obligatorily taught in Hungarian, and skills
such as singing and sports were often taught in Hungarian as well (Berecz
2013). Languages of instruction in history have been Hungarian, Slavic lan-
guages (Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, “Czechoslovak”), Romanian, Hebrew,
Yiddish, and German. Table 3 indicates the statuses of different languages
in education.
Hungarian as a minority language has been used as language of instruction
throughout the twentieth century. In the Czech era, Czech-medium schools were
established in Subcarpathia and the “Czechoslovak” language was taught in
high schools as a compulsory subject. Interestingly enough, in the Hungarian
Table 3: Languages in education in the region during the twentieth century.
Languages of
instruction
Obligatory
taught state
language
Obligatory
taught regional
language
Languages
taught as foreign
language
Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy
(–)
Hungarian, Rusyn,
German, Yiddish,
Romanian, Hebrew
Hungarian – Latin, German
Czechoslovakia
(–)
Czech, Hungarian,
Rusyn, Russian,
Ukrainian,
Romanian, Yiddish,
Hebrew
“Czechoslovak”
(for high
schools)
Rusyn Latin
Hungarian
Kingdom
(–)
Hungarian, Rusyn Hungarian Rusyn Latin
Soviet Union
(–)
Ukrainian, Russian,
Hungarian,
Moldavian
(Romanian)
Russian – English, German,
French
Ukraine (–) Ukrainian,
Hungarian,
Romanian
Ukrainian – English, German,
French
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elementary schools during this period, Rusyn was taught as a compulsory
second language, not as the state language.
As Pavlenko (2011: 39) emphasizes, the Soviet Union never made Russian the
sole language of education; rather, it made possible “instruction in the native
language” of the historical minorities. For instance, in Hungarian schools only the
subject “patriotic education” had to be taught in Russian. In the Soviet Union this
subject covered military skills for boys and auxiliary skills for girls. In addition,
Csernicskó recalls that, attendance reporting at the beginning of Physical
Education classes had to be conducted in Russian, at least on the occasion of a
school inspection. That is, where basic education was concerned, in comparison
to minority languages in Western Europe, Hungarian as a minority language
could be used relatively widely in Transcarpathia during the Soviet period.
More languages have been used as the medium of instruction in elementary
schools (and private schools) than in (state) high schools. For instance, in the
Monarchy era, Rusyn, Romanian, German, Yiddish, and Hebrew were not used
as languages of instruction for the region’s public high schools. Until 1946
foreign languages were taught only in high schools. A standardized form of
Rusyn was never widely accepted, and thus written materials in the vernacular
varied from school to school and from teacher to teacher wherever it was used in
education before 1945.
After 1945 Rusyn was no longer taught in Transcarpathia; however, Russian
became a compulsory language. This being said, local vernaculars did not
disappear altogether from the schools. To begin with, in the early Soviet years,
there was a lack of competent teachers of Russian. In addition, according to
Fedinec (1999: 48), the local Slavic vernaculars “containing Czech, Hungarian
and German expressions” were blamed for the difficulties experienced by the
Transcarpathian population when learning Russian. In the 1950’s there were
Soviet campaigns in some Ukrainian-medium schools to “purify” the language
of the pupils by getting rid of such Transcarpathian idioms.
3 Present (1991–) perspectives
In 1991, Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. The new state
of Ukraine, including Transcarpathia, has faced deep economic trouble and
ethnolinguistic and political division due to the largely “Russian” East and
“Ukrainian” West. Transcarpathia has remained an oddity, not taking part in
the “Russians to Ukrainians” project and dispute. In the periods of political
turmoil in Kyiv, the waves seldom reach Transcarpathia, and when they do
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they are typically depicted by the local population as “imported” conflicts
(e.g. from Lviv).
Transcarpathia experienced the economic catastrophe that the collapse of
the Soviet Union meant for Ukraine. In the 1990s Transcarpathians witnessed
the change from ruble-based economy to barter trade and the use of foreign
currencies. In 1996 hryvnia was introduced, but still today houses and cars are
priced and paid in dollars or euros. People in Transcarpathia, especially in the
Hungarian settlements, have made their living from the resources offered by the
Western border. Most of the people interviewed by Laihonen have worked in
Hungary (or further west) and have been involved in some form of border trade,
such as taking gasoline and cigarettes to the West and bringing food and
Western products to Transcarpathia. Driving people to the West and back has
also been a popular business, since public transportation across the border has
been restricted and cumbersome.
Observing language practices in the field and interviewing local inhabitants, it
appears that among the Slavic languages there is a sort of diglossia, with
Ukrainian (and at times Russian) used in elevated contexts, and a local code
employed in everyday interaction. The Rusyn language/dialects are used by the
younger generations as well. This was evidenced by an American voluntary
worker, who had learnt Ukrainian in the US and in Lviv (Galicia). The volunteer
was teaching English in a Ukrainian-medium school, where she mentioned having
grave difficulties understanding the local Ukrainian spoken by schoolchildren and
was happy that she had found a host family that had moved into Transcarpathia
from Central Ukraine and spoke “clean” Ukrainian. In a similar manner, in inter-
views and other sources (e.g. Kushko 2007), the lingua franca for everyday com-
munication is described as a Rusyn-Russian-Ukrainian (including Hungarian
contact phenomena) variety. This local code differs to a great extent from standard
Ukrainian, which is being taught in schools and used for written administration.
3.1 Ukrainian as state language
Since 1989, Ukrainian has been the only state language in Transcarpathia. The
transition from Russian to Ukrainian has been gradual in Ukraine. For instance,
one of the interviewees remembered that he was doing his military service in
1994 when the language of command changed from Russian to Ukrainian. The
knowledge of the three major languages recorded in the censuses of 1989 and
2001 indicate that knowledge of Russian (or the willingness to claim such) has
dwindled swiftly. Figure 5 shows the changes in knowledge of Russian,
Ukrainian, and Hungarian in Transcarpathia.
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On the basis of the 2001 census Ukrainian is clearly the most widely spoken
language in Transcarpathia: 83 % of the population speaks it (more than one
million people). However, 17 per cent of the Subcarpathian population (more
than 200,000 people) claimed not to speak Ukrainian at all. Most of these
people are Hungarian first-language speakers, though in other surveys (see
Csernicskó, 2013:479) it has been shown that most Hungarians claim to know
both how to read and write either Russian or Ukrainian or both. The prestige of
Russian has dwindled: even though the middle-aged generation in general
stated in interviews that they speak Russian, the census no longer documents
this. The number of Ukrainian speakers as reported in the 2001census is
growing, which is typical for the dominant group. However, according to
research by Csernicskó, Hungarian has higher prestige now than in the
Soviet era. Considering how many Hungarians have moved to Hungary, it is
remarkable that the ratio of Hungarian speakers has grown according to the
last two censuses (1989 and 2001).
In the case of Transcarpathia, the post-Soviet “monolingual turn” (Pavlenko
2013: 266), that is, the idea of a monolingual state regime, is new. For example,
until 1995 the banknotes in Transcarpathia were multilingual. The Austro-
Hungarian krone displayed ten languages (German, Hungarian, Czech, Polish,
Croatian, Slovene, Serbian, Italian, Rusyn, and Romanian), the Czechoslovak
koruna had four (“Czechoslovak”, Rusyn, German, and Hungarian), the
Hungarian pengő seven (Hungarian, German, Slovak, Croatian, Romanian,
Serbian, and Rusyn), and the Soviet ruble 15 languages (not including
Hungarian nor Rusyn, since they were not official languages of the Soviet
Republics). In comparison to other European states, it is remarkable that in
present-day Ukraine monolingual banknotes were introduced in the form of the
Ukrainian hryvnia (see Figure 6).
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The co-existence of different languages and ethnicities has included the long term
co-existence of different writing systems as well. The Latin alphabet has been
used by Hungarians, Czech, Germans, and Slovaks, the Cyrillic alphabet by
Rusyn, Ukrainian, and Russian speakers, and the Hebrew alphabet by Jews.
Cyrillic and Latin are still widely in use, whereas Hebrew is now seen mainly in
Jewish cemeteries and memorial statues. The relationships between the writing
systems provide a further example of changes in language policy. For instance, in
international maps using the Latin alphabet, names were previously transcribed
on the basis of Russian but are now transcribed on the basis of Ukrainian (see
Beregszászi 1995/1996). So the Hungarian town of Beregszász can be found in
Soviet era maps as Beregovo, whereas Google Maps now displays it as Berehove.
Also the official form of personal names was previously recorded according to
Russian form and transliteration e.g. in passports, whereas now it follows
Ukrainian forms. For instance, the Hungarian name Kőszeghy Elemér was
first recorded as Элемыр Кевсеги, but from 1996 in official documents, it
was “re-transliterated” to the forms of Елемир Кевсегі and Elemyr Kevsehi.
In Transcarpathia, Russian first-language speakers, consisting of internal immi-
grants such as Soviet nomenclature and technical experts (e.g. in mining and higher
education), have made up only 5 per cent of the population at most. However,
language policy in Transcarpathia has been characterized by the fact that since
1989 such issues in Ukraine more generally have been burdened by the relationship
between Ukrainian and Russian. Even more than the Baltic states, Ukraine inherited
large Russian-speaking regions and numbers of Russian speakers, who formerly
benefitted from Russian being the official language of the Soviet Union (e.g.
Pavlenko 2008). Since the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, several efforts have been
made to drive Russian out of the public sphere and educational institutions
(Taranenko 2007). These measures to make Ukraine a monolingual European nation
state have met with some support among West European experts. The idea has been
that national cohesion in the society can be achieved only if all inhabitants learn the
Figure 6: Monolingual
Ukrainian hryvnia
(photo by Csernicskó).
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official language, a situation that can be attained only if the state language is given
preference in education and administration (Besters-Dilger 2009). Bowring (2014), in
turn assumes that most inhabitants of Ukraine are bilingual and can easily learn and
use Ukrainian, which is most likely true for the Russian-speaking population.
However, according to Laihonen’s interviews and Csernicskó’s experience in Higher
Education, for the Hungarian-speaking population it takes tremendous effort and
many fail to reach the required level (e.g. the matriculation exam). The experts of the
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages have been a major exception
among Western commentators, stressing that minorities should be consulted and
provided with language rights according to their needs (see Application… 2014: 9).
For the Hungarian elite in Transcarpathia the goal of becoming a romantic
nation state is seen as a general threat to the maintenance of the Hungarian
language and should be replaced by thinking based on the importance of linguis-
tic diversity and the right to use one’s own language (Csernicskó, 2013). Some
Hungarians are now putting their children into Ukrainian-medium schools for the
same reasons their parents’ generation put children into Russian-medium institu-
tions in the Soviet period. The need to learn Ukrainian has been recognized more
generally as well; Hungarian educational institutions in Transcarpathia have put
much effort into enhancing the teaching of Ukrainian in Hungarian schools in
order to avoid 1) an increase in the “educational migration” of Hungarians to
Hungary; and 2) even greater numbers of Hungarian children enrolling in
Ukrainian medium of instruction schools. However, these efforts have failed in
practical terms due to the 2008 requirement that all entrants to all fields of study
in Ukraine should have passed the same exams in Ukrainian language and
literature (for details, see Csernicskó, 2011).
In interviews conducted during fieldwork, Hungarian high school students see a
choice between staying in Transcarpathia (Ukraine) if they achieve an adequate score
on the matriculation exam in Ukrainian language and literature or going to Hungary
for a college or university degree. Like work-based migration, education-based
migration has been experienced by most of the Hungarian families interviewed.
3.2 The 2012 Ukrainian law “on the principles
of state language policy”
In 2012 a new law for Ukraine “on the principles of state language policy” was
accepted.1 While establishing that “the State language of Ukraine is Ukrainian”
1 We are quoting the English translation of the law available at: www.r-u.org.ua/akt/2078-
news.html
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(Article 6), it gave the “regional or national minority languages” wide rights of
use. Such rights were granted in administrative territorial units where at least
ten per cent of the population had chosen a given minority language as their
first language in the 2001 census. According to the law, regional minority
languages should have equal status with the state language in counties,
towns, and municipalities where they were spoken by ten per cent of the
population. In such areas, the administrative bodies should use, protect, and
develop these minority languages. It is notable that for the Transcarpathian case
the Rusyn language was included among the list of minority languages. Figure 7
indicates such territorial units where speakers of minority languages reached ten
per cent in the 2001 census.
In the Transcarpathian Oblast (region) as a whole, Hungarians make up 13 per
cent of the population and thus the county administration should use Hungarian
as an official language as well. Furthermore, Hungarian should be an official
language (together with Ukrainian) in the administration of four districts, six cities
and 104 villages. Other Transcarpathian minorities reach the threshold only in
smaller administrative units. Romanians pass the threshold in ten such units.
Figure 7: Territorial administrative units where speakers of minority languages reached ten
per cent in the 2001 census. (Created by István D. Molnár; sources: Vdovenko 2007; www.
ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/notice/news.php?type¼ 2&id1¼ 21).
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Russian speakers are present as a qualifying minority in three cities, and Slovak
speakers in one municipality. German speakers reach the ten per cent threshold in
two administrative units. Also, the Romani language should now be used in two
municipalities. Even more important to note is that in principle the Rusyn lan-
guage should now be an official language of two districts (four villages).
The implementation of the 2012 Language Act in Transcarpathia has not been
automatic. In the case of Hungarian and Romanian, some city and municipal
councils have taken action to implement the new act. Municipalities where
Hungarians are in the majority used Hungarian widely in administration prior to
2012 as well. However, the act enabled a wider range of bilingual official docu-
ments in such places and more bilingual signs and services in those villages and
towns where Hungarians form the minority. According to Csernicskó, who is
following the process on the spot, in the case of the Romani language and,
what is more, Rusyn, no effort has been made to put the act into practice.
The act was supported by the Eastern, “pro-Russian” regions; most Western
“pro-Ukrainian” regions of Ukraine openly oppose the Act and have not put it into
force. During the revolution of 2014 the Act was cancelled, but then restored once
more. Finally, the act has brought no relief to the most burning question for
Hungarians in respect of education. Article 20 of the Act ensures the right to use
the minority languages as languages of instruction for all subjects, except
“Ukrainian language and literature”. It is notable that “Ukrainian language and
literature” has to be tested in Ukrainian (Article 20, 9.). This indicates that the
basic principle is that whatever the language of teaching and learning, Ukrainian
should be mastered and tested at native level through the matriculation exam.
4 Comparisons and dimensions
4.1 East, West, and local vernaculars as a resource
Lonely Planet advertises Transcarpathia for travellers as follows: “[It is] a melting
pot of Hungarian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Roma cultures and has a fascinating
social mix. It’s also the home of Ukraine’s best red wines and most impenetrable
dialects” (Introducing Transcarpathia 2014). Postcards from the Hungarian
Kingdom show images of “Ruthenian peasants” on the streets of Munkács (Ukr.:
Mukachevo) (e.g. Csernicskó 2013: 68–69). In other words, the multilingual and
multi-ethnic nature of Sub/Transcarpathia has been recognized as a resource.
Furthermore, as the “most impenetrable dialects” indicate, the commodification
of the Rusyn language/dialects occurs. Such a Lonely Planet passage invites the
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tourist, presumably in command of some Slavic language, to entertain linguistic
encounters as a part of the tourist experience (cf. Pietikäinen 2013).
A Rusyn movement has been present since Ukraine’s independence (1991) in
politics, expert discourses, and cultural life. For example, in 2011 there were
nine registered Rusyn organizations in Transcarpathia (Guzinec and Moca 2011:
65–77). However, local, regional, or Rusyn literacy has become visible only in
recent years. The local linguistic perspective has been made visible especially on
the Internet through the showing of hybrid multilingual practices and the local
Slavic repertoire. For instance, there is a project named Наша файта (“Our
kind”), which has uploaded videos on YouTube (e.g. www.youtube.com/watch?
v ¼ ajFKJq-XoPg). These videos are narrated in the local Slavic dialects or
Rusyn language. The characters represent local stereotypes such as Roma beg-
gars, Hungarians who barely speak Ukrainian, and tourists putting on airs in
standard Ukrainian or Russian. The first part has the title “Welcome to
Закарпаття” indicating hybridity in writing systems and in language as a
basic identifying characteristic of the region. Whatever the status of Rusyn,
local observers agree that the local Slavic vernacular has attained new prestige
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 together with the rise of a
distinct Transcarpathian identity typically presented on the Internet (e.g. www.
kolyba.org.ua).
4.2 Globalization in Transcarpathia
In Sociolinguistics of globalization Blommaert (2010) stresses the importance of
investigating sociolinguistic scales and the mobility of linguistic resources and
repertoires. In Transcarpathia, there have been changes in national and
European political frames; however, their penetration into the local level of
language use has been moderate. As we can see, the state has been an
important player in Transcarpathia, for example in the field of education.
However, the state centres have been too far apart culturally, linguistically,
and geographically. That is, the linguistic unification and homogeneity char-
acteristic of nation building and modernization in Western Europe have not
been brought about. Ukrainian nationalism has been a marginal, “imported”,
and very recent phenomenon in Transcarpathia. According to Butt (2002: 156),
the lack of nationalism in general has safeguarded Transcarpathia from local
inter-ethnic tensions and conflict so typical for other parts of Eastern-Central
Europe. That is, Transcarpathians have traditionally taken the stance of “live
and let live” and have not been concerned about residing in a political limbo
(Butt 2002).
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Flows of migration and travel in general have changed their main direction
from East to West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The spread of English
is also evident in Transcarpathia as a major sign of globalization. Global
“Mcdonaldization” (Blommaert 2010: 24), that is, the spread of apparently
uniform (Western) phenomena, is surprisingly absent in the economy of
Transcarpathia; for instance, there is no McDonald’s in the region. However,
the spread of English, typically in youth culture, has reached Transcarpathia.
In elementary schools, English is now learnt from grade one. There are also
native teachers dispatched by American and British organizations in the
majority (Ukrainian-medium) schools, especially in the few urban elite high
schools. However, as Blommaert (e.g. 2010: 24–25) emphasizes, global English
adjusts to the local histories of different linguistic resources in the local
repertoires. A Transcarpathian example is witnessed in Figure 8.
The depicted bus stop is used by border guards, who are typically young con-
scripts from other parts of Ukraine. The main language of graffiti on the bus stop
is Russian; however, there are some advertisements in Hungarian, which is the
language of everyday interaction in the border town itself, and the above text in
English, as well as some tags. Puncs not death in cosino! points to the Russian
form of transcription for the name of the town, now officially Koson’ (from
Ukrainian: Косонь, Hungarian: Kaszony). Further, it shows a truncated reper-
toire (Blommaert 2010: 103) of English literacy consisting of only a few imita-
tions of popular expressions (e.g. Puncs, death). According to Pavlenko (2009:
258), in the post-Soviet space knowledge of Russian as a functional lingua franca
Figure 8: Graffiti on the
bus stop of a border town
in Transcarpathia
(photo by Laihonen).
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still supersedes English, whereas English is now the lingua franca in the sym-
bolic realm. That is, English is a language of high prestige. As Pavlenko (2009:
258) has already pointed out, similarly to this graffiti, English in local (non-
standard) forms with little clear informational content is often used also in
commercial advertising for display purposes. According to our experience,
English is very rarely of any help in getting by; rather, knowledge of
Ukrainian, Russian, or Hungarian is needed in Transcarpathia.
English has been spread by the US and Western Europe in the region. In the
villages where Laihonen carried out fieldwork, it was mentioned as the language
of communication with Western charity organizations typically working among
the Roma. English has also been taught to the border guards, and included in
the linguistic landscape of the border stations, even though the border guards
still appeared to be more confident in Hungarian and Russian in 2012. The
European Football Championship, organized in 2012 in Ukraine, was an event
that generated some signs in English (e.g. along the main roads). Among the
Soviet-educated, and in the cultural sphere, Russian is still holding its place to a
certain extent. Russian music is quite popular among middle-aged and older
people. Contact with other parts of Ukraine were rare; it was often mentioned
that work, study, and travel in the East – common in Soviet times (see also Butt
2002: 157) – have now been replaced by work and study in the West.
4.3 The Hungarian language in Transcarpathia today
The majority of Hungarians in Transcarpathia live in villages and towns, where
Hungarians form the local majority (for details, see Csernicskó, 2005: 96–97). The
South-Western swath of Transcarpathia can be considered as a Hungarian enclave.
This area on the eastern bank of the Tisza river has approximately 120,000
Hungarian-speaking inhabitants out of the total of 150,000 Transcarpathian
Hungarian speakers recorded in the 2001 census. The enclave is much smaller in
geographical size and number of Hungarians than regions in (Southern) Slovakia
and (Central) Romania where Hungarians form the majority.
Some ethnolinguistic perplexities regarding Hungarians also exist. To begin
with, most of the Roma in Transcarpathia speak Hungarian as their first lan-
guage; only a minority of the Roma speak a Romani language or Ukrainian
(Braun etal. 2010: 24–25). The Roma are supported by Western religious and
charity organizations, which has resulted in some linguistic paradoxes too. In
one of the towns that Laihonen visited, there was a special school for Roma
children financed by a Western European organization. Even though the Roma
spoke hardly any Ukrainian, a special Ukrainian-medium elementary school was
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established. Those Roma children that continued their education after this
school attended the Hungarian school. However, in another town, there was a
Roma “camp” (an area separated with walls from the rest of the town), adjoined
by a Hungarian-medium school for the Roma children. The school received
support from Hungary and displayed the Ukrainian, Hungarian, and Roma
flags at the entrance of the institution.
In bilingual (Hungarian-Slavic) settlements, there is evidence that Hungarian
has still retained its prestige: “We can speak both Hungarian and Ukrainian”, one
Hungarian youngster boasted in an interview. This competence indicates that
Hungarians are more socially mobile. Beyond occasional work in Hungary and
trans-border trade as a major source of living, people also prefer to use the
healthcare services in Hungary. For instance, informants for Laihonen often men-
tioned that giving birth in Hungary is a sign of being middle-class. For local needs
and for errands in Hungary, local Ukrainian/Rusyn inhabitants often acquire
Hungarian, at least in villages and towns where Hungarian speakers live. We
can find signs with Hungarian expressions also in Cyrillic texts, such as in
Figure 9.
The Hungarian word Ezermester (Езермештер) “handyman” used as a business
name indicates that the shop sells building materials imported from Hungary,
which, according to Csernicskó’s local knowledge signals that they should be of
good quality. This term is not incorporated in the local Slavic language, and
according to Csernicskó, it is most likely perceived as a name without a meaning
by those who do not speak Hungarian. Other Hungarian expressions are used
Figure 9: Hungarian
Езермештер (Ezermester)
“handyman” incorporated
into a Ukrainian sign for a
building materials shop.
(Photo by Csernicskó).
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both in business signs and in the local Slavic vernacular. For example, bolt
“shop” in the form of Бовт (bovt) has been registered in descriptions of the local
Slavic dialects/the Rusyn language.
The ethnolinguistic Hungarian nation was constructed mainly in the nine-
teenth century together with the standard variety of Hungarian. At that time,
present Transcarpathia was part of four counties of the Hungarian Kingdom.
Geographically, the region was relatively lucky in terms of the Hungarian
standardization, since the dialects that were chosen as the basis of the modern
written Hungarian were close to the dialects spoken in the area. However, since
1920 the Hungarian standard has evolved mainly on the basis of language use
among Budapest intellectual circles, while the use of Hungarian dialect and
dialectal features have been generally stigmatized, especially during the socia-
list period (1948–1989). This has resulted in a general tendency of dialect loss in
Hungary, whereas in the Hungarian minority regions of Romania, Slovakia, and
Ukraine for example, dialect features have been maintained to a greater extent.
Furthermore, due to the fact that Hungarian remained the official language only
in Hungary, various administrative terms have been borrowed from Slavic
languages in Transcarpathia. In Hungary, along with dialectal expressions,
such “hybrid” contact forms, or simply different linguistic practices, are typi-
cally frowned upon, and since the growth of mobility in the post-Soviet era,
discourses on how some Hungarians from Transcarpathia feel out of place in
Hungary have become common (e.g. Csernicskó, 2003). Figure 10 displays an
example of a Hungarian dialectal expression.
The modern standard meaning for hamis is “fake” or “false”. However, the
meaning “bad” or “unreliable” is still widely used among Hungarians in
Figure 10: “Beware the
dog is bad” in a dialectal
form. A Hungarian majority
village in Transcarpathia.
(Photo by Laihonen).
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Romania and eastern parts of Slovakia, and it is also still known in some North-East
regions in Hungary. In Romania or Slovakia, beware of the dog signs in Hungarian
are often manufactured, thus the word hamis is replaced with harapós “[the dog]
bites” in writing. In Transcarpathia, manufactured “beware of the dog” signs can be
found only in Russian, thus the local Hungarian norm is to use hamis in the
meaning of “bad” in writing as well. However, in Hungary town dwellers find it
rather amusing, erroneous (e.g. Hamis kutyák… 2012), or even primitive. This brings
into question the polycentricity andmobility (Blommaert 2010: 39–41) of Hungarian
registers. That is, is the Hungarian written register the sole property of metropolitan
circles? At least for these types of signs, there seem to be clearly different orders of
normativity (Blommaert 2010: 40) in Transcarpathia and in Hungary (for a discus-
sion of Hungarian as a pluricentric language, see Lanstyák 1995).
The local Hungarians have primarily targeted Hungarians from Hungary as
sources of heritage tourism. For Hungarian heritage tourists, there are some
culturally significant destinations in Transcarpathia such as the Verecke pass,
the mythical place of “homecoming” of the Hungarians to Central Europe
around 896. As of recently, Ukrainians have also discovered the Hungarian
enclave; in Ukrainian tourism, practiced by the new upper class, the
Hungarian swath has become a popular destination, conceptualized as cultu-
rally Hungarian but still part of Ukraine, where you can still get served in
Ukrainian (or Russian). As a result, the locals are afraid that jobs in tourism
will go to others, due to their lack of Ukrainian language skills.
As a new phenomenon, Ukrainians from the east are even investing in
tourist sites found in the Hungarian enclave. They regard the Hungarian image
as a resource, as we can see in the thermal bath depicted in Figure 11, 200
meters from the Hungarian border.
This tourist instalment was originally an open air spa during the Soviet
period, with a sanatorium next to it. Now a Ukrainian family from the east has
invested in it and built a luxuriant bath with several Hungarian symbols, such as
statues of Hungarian kings and paintings of Hungarian national events as well
as Hungarian folk motifs. The texts in connection to such images are in
Hungarian only. The more symbolic the sign, the more likely it is to be in
Hungarian only. Most of the functional texts are bilingual, Ukrainian and
Hungarian. Some of them are in English and Ukrainian (e.g. Caution!, Relax
zone), whereas the menus in the Japanese tea house and official signs on the
constituents of the thermal water are only in Ukrainian. That is, the more
functional or official, the more likely it is to be in Ukrainian only.
Here we can notice a global mix: the use of English in a place where the
customers come from the East, combined with the decision to put a Japanese tea
house in a Hungarian spa, together with bars and grills serving traditional
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Hungarian dishes. This indicates that the spa, as Pujolar (2013: 70) has expressed
in relation to Welsh heritage tourism, is negotiating an “aesthetic balance
between providing local flavour and catering to the needs of contemporary
customers”. In our case, it means building the image of a Western instalment,
symbolized by the use of Hungarian emblems and language with some English
and Japanese mixed in. At the same time, however, the Ukrainian tourist is
assured that all this is available without having to go to the trouble of crossing
the Schengen border and without having to cope with a non-Slavic language.
Among local Hungarians, however, the main text on the tower of the
building and above the main entrance, Iváncsó birtok (“Iváncsó estates”), is
seen as a sign of bad taste and putting on airs. It is common knowledge that the
investor was not a Hungarian, imitating the habit of bygone Hungarian nobles
who possessed birtok (“estates”), and combining it with a Slavic name (Iván þ
csó) makes it a cultural and linguistic hybrid, rendering it kitsch in the eyes of
local Hungarians. On top of that, it is a spa, not an estate, so the sign is clearly a
misnomer as far as the locals are concerned. In this manner, the Hungarian
linguistic identity has become commodified and the question asked by Pujolar
(2013: 71): “[W]ho has the right to represent local culture [and language] and
how?” has been posed by the Hungarians in Transcarpathia as well.
5 Conclusions
Is Transcarpathia a place forgotten somewhere in the East European nowhere,
residing in political, cultural, and economic limbo? Most discourses on
Figure 11: “Iváncsó estates,
thermal bath” inHungarian.
A Hungarian majority vil-
lage in Transcarpathia.
(Photo by Laihonen).
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Transcarpathia have taken a different stance. In the pro-Rusyn discourses
Transcarpathia forms the heartlands of Ruthenia. However, among the masses
in Transcarpathia, Rusyn sentiments are less alive than they are among the
emigrants or small number of activists. That is, the local Slavic people have
more or less internalized the idea that Rusyn is a sub-ethnicity and dialect of
Ukrainian and to claim otherwise is often deemed a sign of undesirable separat-
ism or foreign influence. From the point of view of the state, as long as the
majority of Transcarpathians claim Ukrainian nationality, there is no need to
“remember” the region. In economic terms, tourism might present a new oppor-
tunity, especially now (2014) that Ukraine has lost its former major domestic
tourist destination, Crimea.
From the West, the recognition and the revival of the indigenous Rusyn
identity is supported along with general minority rights. At the same time, the
post-Soviet monolingual turn of administration and education towards the
enhanced hegemony of Ukrainian is endorsed by the West, which has a hard
time understanding the complexities or controversies “so exciting to Central
Europe and so difficult for Western Europe to follow” (Macartney 1938, cited
in Butt 2002: 159) such as the Hungarian-speaking Roma in Transcarpathia.
Western economic or cultural support (e.g. the teaching of English for
Ukrainians, charity work among the Roma) typically presupposes a nation
state established with assimilated minorities and is uneasy when facing the
complexities of Transcarpathia. Russian is becoming marginal among the
youth; however, it is still present in many ways as a functional lingua franca,
though it has lost its prestige to English.
The Hungarians of Transcarpathia perceive themselves to be even more
distant from Kyiv than their Slavic neighbours. In particular, the residents of
the region next to the Hungarian border imagine their villages as a splinter of
Hungary proper and try to make the “fuzzy” (cf. Butt 2002) post-Soviet East-West
border a resource. At the same time, the local Hungarians possess multilingual
repertoires, and there are complexities in their repertoire of Hungarian registers.
Furthermore, Hungarian languaging is practiced by non-Hungarians in tradi-
tional bilingual settings and in new, unexpected places and ways.
To conclude, Transcarpathia presents a historical case of enduring “pre-
nationalism”, and linguistic pragmatism. It is similar to emerging new situations
in Western Europe, where people “focus meaningfully and in a non-random way
on specific arrangements of resources in a repertoire that is fundamentally
“hybridized”, multiscalar and shot through with relatively unpredictable and
unstable patterns of stratified indexical orderliness.” (Blommaert 2013: 614). It
remains to be seen whether Transcarpathia can avoid the monolingual turn
underway in the Post-Soviet space.
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